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Abstract
This paper examines the gender earnings gap at the executive level on a unique data set of Danish
executives in the period 1992-1995. Ordinary wage equations show that the wage gap disappears
when controlling for “Who you are”, “Where you work” and “What you do”. Additionally,
decomposition into inter- and intra-occupational differences shows that two thirds of the wage gap
are due to differences between occupations. Individual-specific characteristics contribute
negatively to the wage gap, i.e. in favour of women. Decomposing by real authority level shows
a larger unexplained part of the wage gap. Real authority is more discriminating than formal
authority.
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1. Introduction
Gender compensation gaps have been analysed for many years and many reasons. Blau and Kahn,
who have done many studies of the gender wage gap, have a recent and thorough overview of
gender differences in pay, Blau and Kahn (2000). The gender aspects have by now moved up the
ladder to become an issue at the executive level. Bertrand and Hallock (2000) point at two good
reasons for doing so: The great interest in finding an answer to the question: “Why are there so
few women at the top?”, and the obvious similarity among the executives having reached the top
concerning human capital, motivation and ambitions. For several reasons, not always understood,
women are disregarded in promotion or engagement of employees at the top executive level in
firms. Having no analyses confirming that male executives are better at their jobs than female
executives, there must be unexploited resources in the mass of women not being taken into
account when recruiting or developing new top executives.
In this paper, we analyse these issues at the top executive level in Danish privately owned firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theory and some of the
previous research of executive compensation and wage differentials between men and women.
Section 3 describes data in detail before section 4 shows results from a wage equation on real total
annual compensation. Section 5 decomposes the gender earnings gap into both inter- and intra-
occupational differences and justified and unjustified differences.
2. Theory and previous research
Most theory on executive compensation has its offspring in the principal-agent theory, Murphy
(2000). As the principal observes the level of output and not the level of effort, the compensation
to the manager has to induce the manager to act in the principal’s best interest, Holmström (1979).
See Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) and Murphy (2000) for recent surveys and discussions on
the theoretical and empirical aspects of managerial pay. Agency models typically predict a positive
correlation between managerial pay and a measure firm performance. Danish executives
experience a weak but significant pay for performance relation looking at CEO’s, higher- and
lower-level managers, but no punishment to managers in failing firms, Eriksson and Lausten
(2000).
Firm size is also known to have significant impact on compensation as CEO’s in larger firms get
paid more, Rosen (1992). In addition, other factors such as other firm-specific, occupational-
specific and individual-specific factors are important to empirically obtain a solid prediction of
managerial compensation.
Even though the labour market participation of Danish women is among the highest in the world
(73.5% in 1999), employment of women in top corporate jobs still is scarce. A Danish magazine,1 This sample contains Danish firms fulfilling the criteria of an annual turnover of at least DKK 50 million, or a
gross earning of at least DKK 20 million, or at least 50 employees and a CEO appointed before 1997. 
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aiming at the trades and industries, has found that only 16 firms in a sample of almost 5000 Danish
firms
1 had a woman as CEO in 1999, Børsens Nyhedsmagasin (1999). 
The reasons for this can be various and many. It is always an advantage to know someone who
knows someone who knows someone. The networks to other executives are usually built in the
period, where the women have to decide on family and children and therefore are absent from the
labour market for at least one period. Alliances through networks can show the way to power and
men do - in prejudice - have better networks than women (old mens network) and women are kept
out of these networks.
In Denmark, we have a term called “the Rip, Rap and Rup Effect” named after Donald Duck’s
three nephews: Huey, Dewey and Louie. This term covers the fact that “Men employ men”, or
“We employ someone looking like us”. Male executives support and promote other men looking
like themselves and they use eachothers success to their own advantage. As long as there are very
few women at the top it is continuously very hard for new women to enter.
Equal rights have been debated and dealt with for a long time period. In the US, the gender pay
gap has narrowed dramatically the past 25 years and women have entered occupations former
known as traditionally male-dominated areas, Blau and Kahn (2000). Apparently, the Danish
gender wage gap has not been declining in the same period, Rosholm and Smith (1996) and Datta
Gupta et al. (1999). Additionally, the occupational segregation in Denmark has remained stable
since the 1980s. In other words, the catching up on education and experience of Danish women
has been more than wiped out by unfavourable wage structure effects, Datta Gupta et al. (1999).
Groshen (1991) and Bayard et al. (1999) have examined the impact of  gender segregation on
gender wage gap in the United States using establishment-based data. The results suggest that the
level of gender segregation accounts for a large portion of the gender gap. Though, there remains
a significant difference in wages between men and women in the latter, after controlling for human
capital characteristics.
Gender segregation in employment is relatively high in Denmark, Asplund et al. (1997). Datta
Gupta and Rothstein (2000) analyse the impact from segregation of women into certain industries,
establishments and job cells on the Danish gender wage gap. They find that occupational
differences account for much of the wage gap, showing a difference of 34% before controlling for4
anything. After controlling for all possible human capital characteristics and job-cell fixed effects,
there still remains an earnings gap between men and women.
 
When talking about a glass ceiling encountered by women in leading positions, we mean the
phenomenon whereby women do quite well in the labour market up to a certain point after which
there is an effective limit on their prospects, i.e. a glass ceiling. The glass ceiling prevents women
from being promoted in the same degree as men and it delays or even ends the women’s progress
up the corporate ladder. Another implication of the glass ceiling is that women’s wages fall behind
men’s more at the top of the wage distribution than in the middle or in the bottom.
Albrecht et al. (2000) show evidences of an existing and non-diminishing glass ceiling in Sweden,
1981-1992. Datta Gupta et al. (2000) provide strong evidence that in Denmark women in the
highest decile experience the largest widening in the gender wage gap from 1983 to 1995,
suggesting the same glass ceiling effect for Danish female executives as for their Swedish
counterparts. 
Gregg and Machin (1994) find no evidence that the glass ceiling is cracking in corporate Britain
in the early 1990s. Bertrand and Hallock (2000) show that the glass ceiling in the United States
seems not to be waterproof and the number of women in the top-level management of US
corporations has increased substantially in the mid-1990s.
To investigate whether the glass ceiling exists or is cracking in Denmark requires more data than
available in this analysis. It is necessary to have information on promotions and to examine the
gender wage gap in different parts of the wage distribution and in different parts of the job
distribution. As the data available only include employees in leading positions with no information
on promotion, a thorough analysis of the glass ceiling is postponed to future analyses.
3. Data description
The data used in this analysis come from two separate sources. The main part of the data set is an
unbalanced panel containing information about 370 Danish firms with 5885 individual observations
on executives being Chief Executive Officers (CEO’s), Vice Presidents (VP’s), higher-level
managers and lower-level managers during a four-year-period (1992-1995). The data have been
obtained from the confidential files of a major Danish consulting firm (Dansk Management Forum)
and provide detailed information about the managers' individual characteristics (age, gender,
education and tenure in current job), their compensation (with and without bonus payments), their
currently held position (job title, functional area, number of subordinates, level of authority) and
some characteristics of the firms in which they are employed (size, location, industry and type of5
firm). Thus, the data allow us to analyse effects of individual-specific characteristics, job-specific
characteristics, and firm-specific characteristics on the determination of compensation.
Additional information on the firms’ performance, ownership, governance and type of production
is obtained from an annual handbook listing all major Danish firms with an annual turnover
exceeding DKK 40 million (in 1994 prices) or with more than 50 employees (Greens - Børsens
håndbog om dansk erhvervsliv). Most of the firms are medium-sized or large (in the Danish sense)
firms and so, they are obviously not representative of all Danish firms. However, the data set is
representative of the medium-sized and large firms (with respect to the distribution across
industries). Further details on the data set can be found in Eriksson and Lausten (2000), Eriksson
(2000) and Lausten (2001).
In the panel, the gender variable only occurs in 1995. This implies that executives not included in
the 1995 wave are lost for this analysis. This sample of Danish executives contains a relatively
large share of women, compared to other recent studies of gender gaps among executives, e.g.
Bertrand and Hallock (2000). As seen in Table 1, about 6.5% of the sample of Danish executives
are women.  
Similar to other studies, women are under-represented in the top two occupational categories and
in functional areas as executives of computer departments and in technical, production and quality
managements. Only 1% of the CEO’s in the sample is women. 












CEO 863    1.27% 1.8 1.01
Head of the division  414    3.14% 1.16 0.81**
Executive of sales, marketing and advertising 1340    6.49% 0.84 0.82***
Executive of technical, production and quality management  1101    3.27% 0.82 0.82***
Executive of economy, finance and administration (CFO) 820    10.73% 0.9 0.93**
Executive of purchasing, logistics and materials 343    4.37% 0.79 0.71***
Executive of personnel and organization 357    28.29% 0.82 0.88***
Executive of computer department 292    1.03% 0.78 1.03
Executive of research and development (R&D) 272    6.25% 0.85 0.98
Executive of information and communication 83    9.64% 0.84 0.95
All executives 5885    6.44% - 0.77
Source: The numbers derive from the Danish data set on executives, 1992-1995.
Note: *** indicates that means for men and women are significantly different at 0.01 and ** indicates significant
at 0.05.6
Column 3 reports the mean compensation for each occupation relative to the overall mean
compensation in the sample. CEO’s and heads of divisions are compensated higher than the
average market wage, while the rest, which is 78% of the sample, is compensated lower than the
average market wage. Comparing the figures from Table 1 with their American counterparts, the
occupational wage relative to the market wage (column 3) is not showing as much variation in
Denmark as in the US. At the same time, the female/male wage ratio by occupation is much less
than the female/male wage ratios shown in Bertrand and Hallock (2000). There is no occupational
group among high executives in Denmark having an unconditional wage ratio higher than 20%.
Here it should be pointed out that the female/male wage ratio for the CEO’s is larger than one,
saying that once the women make it to the top, they get compensated higher on average than male
CEO’s. And these figures are without any control of any characteristics.
A graphical presentation in Figure 1 of the distribution of men and women on occupational groups
leaves the impression that women go for a few specific occupational groups at the executive level.
Figure 1. The distribution of men and women on occupational group
Women seem to cluster in the three occupational groups: Executive in sales, marketing and
advertising, (23% of the women), executive in economy, finance and administration (23% of the
women) and executive in personnel and organization (27% of the women). Three quarters of the
women in the sample are employed in just three of the ten occupational groups recorded here,
whereas men are represented the most as CEO (15% of the men), executive of sales, marketing
and advertising (22% of the men) and executive of technical, production and quality management
(19% of the men). 7
Average annual total compensation split up on gender and occupational group is presented in
Figure 2. This is the average compensation behind the female/male wage ratio in Table 1. Here,
the differences in compensation between the CEO’s and the other executives are highly visible.
Figure 2. Average total wage for men and women
In addition to the ten occupational groups, the sample is split up in three broad categories: CEO’s,
higher-level managers and lower-level managers. The definition of higher- and lower-level
managers is based on a classification of jobs according to responsibility and authority levels, as
used by the consulting firm that has collected the data, and it is defined across the nine
occupational groups below the CEO level. Thus, a lower-level manager’s job is classified as a
tactics-level job, the higher-level manager’s job as a strategy-level job and the CEO’s job as a
policy-level job. The distribution of men and women on these three broad categories is shown in
Figure 3.
Figure 3. The distribution of men and women on CEO’s, higher-level and lower-level executives8
This distribution on CEO’s, higher-level and lower-level executives is used in the following as the
number of women in each job-cell is too small to be adequate for wage equations on gender and
occupational level. The corresponding averages of total compensation for male and female CEO’s,
higher-level and lower-level executives are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Average total compensation for male and female CEO’s, higher-level and lower-level
executives
As seen in Figure 4, female CEO’s and female higher-level executives on average have a higher
annual total compensation than their male counterparts. This is probably driven by the fact that
the statistical minimum compensations for women in these categories are higher than the minimum
compensations for men and that the number of women to form this average is much lower than
the number of men. This still holds if the sample is split into years, 1992-1995. In addition, the
highest paid higher-level executive being a woman is paid 6 to 33% higher than her male
counterpart in all years.
Does this show that women, who have slipped through the eye of the needle, are more capable
than the men being there in the first place, and women are then compensated accordingly? Or do
firms overcompensate the women, who have made their way to the top, to hold on to the female
executives?
3.1. Individual-specific characteristics
It is not just the compensation showing a visible difference between the sexes. Individual
characteristics also contributed to “the great mystery”. As seen in Figure 5, age is distributed
differently for men and women in the sample.
The male age distribution has only one peak at 48 years of age, whereas the female age
distribution has three peaks at 33, 41 and 48 years of age. On average, female executives are9
younger than male executives. Splitting the sample into CEO’s, higher-level and lower-level
managers gives the impression that age does not matter for men, whereas women’s age, though
the profile is difficult to interpret because of the scarce number of observations, does matter. The
lowest peak at 33 years comes from the female lower-level executives, the peak at 41 years of age
comes from the female higher-level executives and the oldest peak at 48 years of age comes from
the female CEO’s. Female CEO’s are between 40 and 50 years old, whereas male CEO’s are
between 30 and 66 years old.
Figure 5. The age distribution of Danish male and female executives, 1992-1995, pooled sample
As concerning the tenure in current job, the peaks for males and females are the same at one year,
but the maximum tenure in current job is 20 years higher for the male executives than for the
female executives. This implies that average tenure for females are about 4 years, whereas the
average male tenure in current job is almost 6 years.
Table 2. The distribution of men and women at educational level
Men Women All
Basic education or higher education of 1 - 2½



























The human capital variables in this sample are age, tenure and level of education. Education is split
into three dummies, where the distribution of men and women at these levels of education is put
forth in Table 2. The dummies split the executives into three groups; (1) Executives having a basic
education (e.g. apprenticeship, technical assistant) or higher education of 1 - 2½ years’ duration
as the most (e.g. datanomist, building technician, trilingual commercial correspondent), (2)
executives having an education of 3 - 4 years’ duration at medium level (e.g. B.Sc., B.Com.,
engineer, journalist, diploma in LSP, teacher), or (3) executives having a higher-level higher
education of 5 years’ duration (e.g. MSc (econ), (com) etc., computer scientist, graduate engineer,
architect) eventually supplemented by 2 - 3 years’ additional studies (e.g. PhD, certified public
accountant).
3.2. Firm-specific characteristics
The firm-specific effects in this sample include size, location, industry and type of firm. Size is
measured by several variables: Sales per year, number of employees and outcome after tax
payments. 
Ownership of the firm is split into six categories: foreign-owned firms, privately owned firms,
firms owned by another company or a holding company, fund-owned firms, firms with dispersed
ownership and state-owned or cooperative societies. 42% of the firms are owned by another
company or by a holding company and 28% of the firms are foreign-owned.
Location of the firm is of course measuring area of living for the executives, but cannot be
classified as individual characteristics, as the employees have to work where the firm is located.
Average measures of the firm-specific characteristics of interest are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Average measures of selected firm characteristics
Men Women
Average turnover per year, million DKK 1877.61 1834.49
Average number of employees 1375 2293
Share employed in foreign-owned firms 23.8% 30.6%
Share employed in the metropolitan area 66.1% 76.8%
Share employed in independent firms 22.9% 19.3%
Share employed in firms founded before 1940 46.6% 39.8%
3.3. Job-specific characteristics
As mentioned above, the data set contains information about the level of authority for each
individual. This is not bound up with functional area or higher-/lower-level executive. It is11
summarised in the form of an authority index constructed from an evaluation system for positions
used by the consulting firm, and it is based on four factors. The first factor is the complexity of
the problems to be solved independently by the executives; the second is the degree of freedom
in decision making; the third is the intensity and complexity of the communication of the results
of the tasks performed; and the fourth is the degree of responsibility in managing subordinates or
solving specialist tasks. The index classifies jobs into 6 levels of authority, where the 6
th and
highest level of authority is extremely rare and therefore put into level 5. Table 4 shows the
average total annual compensation split up by gender, CEO/higher-/lower-level executive and level
of authority.
Table 4. Average compensation, split by gender and authority level
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Women CEO’s - - 573,002 1,348,702 1,500,000
Higher-level 513,889 600,125 685,681 1,122,192 2,200,675
Lower-level 379,996 499,666 622,023 - -
Men CEO’s - - 829,535 1,171,039 1,516,446
Higher-level 570,388 600,312 763,021 1,041,780 973,148
Lower-level 417,981 506,309 632,322 893,519 -
Source: The data set on Danish executives, 1992-1995.
Note: Compensation is here shown in real Danish kroner.
Recent analyses of authority in hierarchies point to the importance of distinguishing between
formal and real authority, e.g. Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Eriksson (2000). Formal authority
refers to the power to choose goals and the responsibility for the outcomes of actions taken by
persons themselves as well as their subordinates. Formal authority cannot be delegated and is
represented in this sample by the dummies for the occupational groups, especially for the CEO’s
and the heads of divisions. Real authority is the power to determine which actions to choose in
order to achieve certain goals. Delegation of real authority means that the contracts are left
unspecified or incomplete. 
As seen in Table 4, the levels of real authority are compensated differently. This indicates that both
formal and real authority should be taken into account in determining wages to see how the two
kinds are rewarded and to test whether the gender wage gap is influenced by level of authority.12
4. The gender gap
The gender wage gap can be analysed in several ways. The impact from individual-, firm- and job-
specific characteristics is here analysed through regression analyses of the total annual
compensation as follows. Table 5 shows results from ordinary least squares regressions using the
logarithm of real total annual compensation as the dependent variable. All regressions include
control for time indicator variables to take account of the larger share of women in the later years
of the sample. 
The unconditional gender gap in this sample of Danish executives is 23%. When looking at the
pooled sample of executives, no matter whether they are male or female, young or old, CEO or
managing R&D, and not taking any facts about the firm into account, the gender wage gap is 23%
in the period 1992-1995. This is not any different from what is found for the Danish labour force
as a whole, see Rosholm and Smith (1996) for evidences on the gender gap in the 1970s and
1980s and Pedersen and Deding (2000) or Datta Gupta et al. (2000) for  more recent analyses.
But this raw mean male-female wage differential may overstate the actual differences in earnings
since men and women may not be directly comparable in terms of acquired human capital. With
the Groshen (1991) phrase in mind: “Is It Who You Are, What You Do or Where You Work?”,
any possible individual-specific characteristic is included in column (2). As mentioned earlier, the
sample does not include family characteristics such as marriage, number of children and the like,
as is usually taken into account when talking about the gender wage gap. In this study, individual
characteristics are age, actual tenure in the job and level of education. This is not considered as
a restriction as this sample is assumed to be a homogeneous group of people. Having reached a
job level with a certain amount of authority men and women are assumed to have the same level
of motivation and ambitions. The gender earnings gap is reduced by 50%, when individual
characteristics are taken into account. This result is likely to be driven by the fact that women on
average are 5 years younger and have 2 years shorter tenure in current jobs as men. As known
from other studies, returns to age and experience are high at the executive level and therefore, we
see that 50% of the gender wage gap is due to “who you are”.
The usual human capital variables all obtain significant coefficients with expected signs. Here, we
have to be careful with the interpretation of the age variable. Age could, in the absence of a
variable measuring actual labour market experience, be taken as a proxy for the experience. As
women are most likely to have a shorter labour market experience than men, because of periods
out of the labour force maintaining the family, the age variable gets a less favourable coefficient
for women than for men. 13
Table 5. Estimating the Gender Wage Gap in Total Compensation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender -0.2360* -0.1171* -0.2946* -0.0660*










Dummy for medium-level education, 3-4 years 0.1727*
(0.011)





Dummy for Foreignly owned firm -0.0566*
(0.012)
Dummy for Metropolitan area 0.1181*
(0.011)
Dummy for old firms (founded before 1975) -0.0313*
(0.015)
Women in old firms (founded before 1975) 0.0615
(0.054)
Job-specific characteristics:
Dummy for CEO (formal position) 0.0586*
(0.012)
Dummy for head of division (formal position) 0.0591*
(0.011)
Authority index (real authority) 0.2620*
(0.004)
Memb. board of the group of firms 0.1742*
(0.013)
Memb. of board of direction 0.0566*
          (0.010)
Intercept 6.4454* 4.0391* 6.3307* 5.7242*
(0.014) (0.132) (0.025) (0.010)
Dummies for occ. group no no no no
Dummies for Industry no no no no
Adj. R squared 0.0322 0.2440 0.0581 0.7613
Note: All regressions include control for time indicator variables. * indicates significancy at 0.01, whereas **
indicates significancy at 0.10.14
Table 5 continued
Variable (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Gender -0.1474* -0.0436* -0.0218 -0.0089 -0.0051
(0.044) (0.010) (0.030) (0.023) (0.022)
Individual-specific characteristics:
Age 0.0819* 0.0309* 0.0543* 0.0311* 0.0276*
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Age squared -0.0007* -0.0003* -0.0005* -0.0003* -0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Tenure in current job 0.0001 0.0010 0.0039* 0.0017 0.0030*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure squared -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0002* -0.0001* -0.0001*
(0.0001) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.00005) (0.00004)
Dummy for medium-level education, 3-4 years 0.1788* 0.0315* 0.1049* 0.0391* 0.0483*
(0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Dummy for higher-level education, ￿ 5 years 0.3173* 0.0769* 0.1671* 0.0766* 0.0837*
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm-specific characteristics:
Ln(sales) 0.0118* 0.0302* 0.0208* 0.0206*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Dummy for Foreignly owned firm -0.0109 0.0103 0.0265* 0.0220*
(0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Dummy for Metropolitan area 0.0969* 0.0723* 0.0541* 0.0522*
(0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Dummy for old firms (founded before 1975) -0.0281* 0.0343* 0.0252* 0.0164*
(0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Women in old firms (founded before 1975) -0.0255 -0.0623** -0.0470** -0.0501*
(0.048) (0.033) (0.026) (0.024)
Job-specific characteristics:
Dummy for CEO (formal position) 0.0683* 0.3511* 0.0912*
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Dummy for head of division (formal position) 0.0511* 0.1651* 0.0469*
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Authority index (real authority) 0.2412* 0.2322* 0.1955*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Memb. board of the group of firms 0.1737* 0.4866* 0.1818* 0.1611*
(0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
Memb. of board of direction 0.0487* 0.3027* 0.0747* 0.0462*
          (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Intercept 3.9290* 4.9073* 4.4193* 4.7266* 4.8987*
(0.132) (0.072) (0.091) (0.070) (0.068)
Dummies for occ. group no no no no yes
Dummies for Industry no no no no yes
Adj. R squared 0.2604 0.7778 0.6477 0.7933 0.8111
Note: All regressions include control for time indicator variables. * indicates significant at 0.01, whereas **
indicates significancy at 0.10.2 The Danish corporate governance system is exerted by law through a two-tier board system: a supervisory board
to take care of the shareholders’ interests and a day-to-day board of managers.
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If the gender earnings gap should be explained by sole firm-specific characteristics (as in column
3), the gender wage gap among Danish executives raises to 29%. The larger the firm is (according
to sales per year) the higher the executive is compensated. Executives in foreign-owned firms or
firms founded before 1975 get compensated significantly lower than their counterparts employed
in domestically owned firms or newer firms, respectively. 
Executives employed in firms situated in the area of Copenhagen get compensated significantly
higher than other executives. This is in line with results from most Danish studies on wage
determination.
In contrast to this, the gender wage gap is reduced by about 75% if we specify the wage
determination on the job-specific characteristics only, as in column (4). The wage gap is now
down to 7%, but still significantly different from 0. The R
2 is more than trebled from column (2).
Here we see that it is very important to take “what you do” into account, when talking about
gender wage gap at the executive level. 
Adding the “where you work”-characteristics to the specification already including the individual-
specific characteristics does not improve the wage gap from column 2. Column (5) does not show
any lower wage gap than the earnings equations based on individual characteristics. This indicates
that women are not segregated into firms generally known as low-paying firms. Additionally, it
indicates that firm size does not have any significant impact on women’s compensation. Danish
female executives are not generally employed in smaller firms than men, which is the reality for
the American female executives in Bertrand and Hallock (2000).
Adding the “what you do”-characteristics in column (6) gives a much lower wage earnings gap,
which strengthens the indication from column (4). 
Including membership of the board, whether this is the supervisory board or the board of
managers,
2 as in column (7), and indication of the level of real authority, as in column (8), makes
the wage gap disappear. The combination of individual-, firm- and job-specific characteristics as
in column (8), where we take both formal position of the top two occupations and the real
authority practised in the firm, there seems to be no gender earnings gap left. Real authority
obviously exhausts the power of the top two occupations (the CEO and the head of division) and
the dummies for membership of the board as these variables partially cover the same. Still, there3 This confirms the fact that most female CEO’s are employed in old firms and are members of the board. Hereby
the interaction-term, women in old firms, mostly covers the women being higher-level or lower-level executives.
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is a significant positive outcome of being CEO or head of division, after controlling for a wide
range of individual-, firm- and job-specific characteristics.
 
Controlling for individual-, firm- and job-specific characteristics now results in a significantly
higher compensation for executives working in old firms (founded before 1975). But in addition
to this, women in old firms get compensated significantly lower than female executives employed
in newer firms. Memberships of the boards have an important impact here, indicating interactions
between these characteristics. A dummy for interaction between gender and membership of the
boards (not shown here) comes out positively and significant, telling that being a woman and a
member of the board gives significantly higher compensation.
3 
There is a noticeable and significant difference in total compensation between men and women at
23% if gender is the only characteristic taken into account (column (1)). But after having
controlled for all possible individual-, firm- and job-specific characteristics there is no difference
in the compensation of men and women at the high executive level in Denmark.
As seen through combinations of the characteristics in columns (2) to (6), the gender gap has more
than one dimension. The coefficient indicating the gender gap does not become insignificant until
the explanatory variables consist of interactions of both firm- and job-specific characteristics.
Wage differentials are a combination of  “Who You Are, Where you work and  What You Do!”
Changing the final wage equation to include the three occupational groups employing most
women, the groups of executives in sales, marketing and advertising (23% of the women),
executives in economy, finance and administration (23% of the women) and executives in per-
sonnel and oganization (27% of the women), we find that executives in economy, finance and
administration do not get compensated any different from other executives. Contrary to this,
executives in sales, marketing and advertising get paid 2-3% more than executives from other job-
categories, and executives in personnel and organization get paid 5% less. But inclusion of these
occupational categories does not change the level or significance of the gender variable. Making
the three occupational groups into interaction terms with the gender variable leads all to
insignificant coefficients. This indicates that women in these three occupational groups do not get
compensated differently than women in other occupations.
The knowledge about the endogeneity of the job-specific characteristics makes interpretation of












ˆ ˆ ln ln m f f mf m X ww X β β −= − (2)
() () ˆˆ ˆ ln ln mf f mm m ff ww X X X ββ β −= − + − (3)
concerning job status and authority. The job-specific characteristics can throw some light on the
differences in level of compensation between male and female executives, if the analysis is handled
differently. The following section shows the analysis of the gender wage gap using occupational
segregation as explanatory variable. Finally, authority level is used in the same matter.
5. Decomposition of the gender gap
The wage equations in the former section are taking the gender distribution on occupations as
given. There is no question about segregation or whether this has any influence on the wage gap.
To abolish this restriction, we can decompose the gender wage gap using occupational segregation
as explanatory power.
The underlying model is the usual decomposition introduced by Oaxaca (1973). Oaxaca (1973)
shows a method to decompose the gender wage gap into a part, which is due to differences in the
characteristics observed and a part that is still unexplained and therefore often mentioned as the
“pure discrimination” part. The wage equation estimated for each sex is:
where the i index indicating individuals is suppressed. The male-female wage differential is found
by subtracting the mean wage for women from the mean wage for men:
Inclusion of   leads to the decomposition: 0 mf mf XX ββ −=
This is evaluated using the male wage distribution as baseline. The first term on the right-hand side
measures the wage differences due to differences in characteristics. If men and women had equal
characteristics, this term would equal zero. The second term measures the wage differential due
to differences in compensation of the characteristics. This second term is by Oaxaca (1973) and
many of his successors defined as the wage discrimination between men and women (or blacks and
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Brown et al. (1980) are using the wage effects from occupational segregation to improve the
model on wage differentials between men and women, which is an extension of Oaxaca (1973).
Brown et al. (1980) merges the behavioural models of occupational attainment and the gender
wage distributions and from this a more accurate decomposition of the gender wage gap derives,
Miller (1987). 
Here we use the fact of the weighted average wages across the K occupations:
where Pm (Pf) is the proportion of the male (female) workforce employed in occupation j. Inclusion
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consist of intra-occupational and inter-occupational wage components:
The first term on the right-hand side measures the part of the gap that is due to differences in the
mean wages within occupations, whereas the second term measures the part due to differences in
the distribution of men and women across occupations. 
The intra-occupational and inter-occupational components each contain elements which can be
viewed as either (1) wage differences due to differences in characteristics, or (2) wage differences
due to different remuneration of the characteristics (the discriminatory wage factors). Therefore,
the terms are decomposed further using the predicted distribution of women across occupations
in the absence of discrimination (a distribution where women simulate male characteristics).
To do this, it is necessary to simulate the distribution of women on occupations, using male
characteristics. As formerly known, the conditional probability that individual i ends up in
occupation j, Pij, can be written as:19
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where Zi is a vector of personal and labour market characteristics for individual i and j symbolizes
the occupation concerned. As the variable of occupations contains more than two levels, an
estimation using un-ordered logit misleads the results. Using an ordered probit model, the
predicted conditional probability that an individual will be observed in occupation j is given by:
where 0 represents the standard normal cumulative density function, â the estimated coefficients,
and ￿ ˆ‘s are estimated separation points, see Miller (1987) and Maddala (1983) for further
information. 
Ordered probit models are estimated separately for men and women. The results are not shown
here as the estimates are difficult to interpret. Positive coefficients indicate a higher probability of
being located in an occupation at a higher level. The outcome shows the predicted probability for
each individual of being employed in one of the occupational groups. 
We can simulate the occupational distribution the female executives would obtain if their attributes
were rewarded in the same manner as those of their male counterparts. This is constructed by
using the female individual characteristics, valued by the male coefficients from the ordered probit
on male executives. This simulated distribution is subsequently indicated by P ￿ 
f and will be used
to decompose the wage gap between the occupations caused by different occupational
distributions for men and women.
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the wage differentials using occupational segregation becomes:
where P ￿ 
f denotes the simulated distributions across occupations of the female workforce, using
the male coefficients and the female characteristics. 4 Here, as well as in the usual Oaxaca-decomposition, we have to consider the index-number problem. Using the
coefficients from the male sample regressions can though be justified from the fact that the labour market for
executives is male-dominated and therefore male executives are hardly facing any discrimination.
5 The underlying ordered probit model of occupational attainment is not shown in this paper, because the
parameter estimates are difficult to interpret. The ordered probit is just made for the purpose of simulating the
occupational distribution for women.
20
Equation (6) shows the wage differential from the intra-occupational component split up into (6a)
wage differences due to differences in characteristics (the first term) and (6b) wage differences due
to different remuneration of the characteristics (the second term), also called pure discrimination.
In the intra-occupational component, the distributions on occupations are taken as given, whereas
in the inter-occupational component, the distributions are put into question. 
Consequently, Equation (7) shows the wage differential from the inter-occupational component
split up into (7a) explained wage differences due to differences in occupational distributions
caused by different wage-related attributes (different X’s) through the actual male distribution and
the simulated female distribution (the first term), and (7b) unexplained wage differences due to
different remuneration of the characteristics (different ￿’s) in the simulated female distribution
across occupations and the actual female distribution, the discrimination part (the second term).
4
The procedure in this decomposition is as follows:
1. First we estimate ordered probit split by gender and using the occupational grouping higher-
level/lower-level managers to order the sample.
2. Next we simulate the female distribution as if they had the male characteristics.
3. Ordinary wage equations are then estimated for each occupational group and sex (four
equations all in all).
4. Decomposition of the gender earnings gap is then made using inter- and intra occupational
differences and justified and un-justified differences.
To compare the results from the following decomposition with the final model of the ordinary
wage equations in Table 5 and to overcome problems with too few observations, I have chosen
to pool the CEO’s and the higher-level executives and to do the decomposition of the gender
wage gap on the two occupational categories: Higher-level executives and lower-level executives.
Hereby I can use all the explanatory variables from model 11 in Table 5 in the decomposition.
Table 6 shows the actual male and female occupational distribution as well as the simulated
occupational distribution for the female executives.
5 The simulated occupational distribution, P ￿ f,
shows the distribution that the female executives would obtain if their attributes were rewarded
in the same manner as those of their male counterparts. 6 The Duncax index, generally expressed as a percentage, shows the proportion of women who have to change
occupations for the distribution of men and women to be the same across occupations. The index is computed as
D = ½￿i￿mi - fi￿, where mi (fi) is the proportion of the men (women) employed in occupation j.
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distribution, P ￿  f
Higher-level executives 15.6 40.5 19.6
Lower-level executives 84.4 59.5 80.4
Total 100 100 100
Note: P
 f is the actual distribution of female executives on occupations.
P
 m if the actual distribution of male executives on occupations.
P ￿  f is the simulated distribution of female executives, using male coefficients on female characteristics.
Although the simulated female distribution shows the distribution of female executives having their
attributes rewarded as male executives, the share of female executives in the group of higher-level
managers is still far below the actual share of male higher-level executives. The Duncan index of
dissimilarity
6 indicates a marked difference between the occupational distributions of male and
female executives. Using the actual distributions, the Duncan index shows that 25% of the female
executives would have to shift from lower-level executives to higher-level executives to make the
female distribution congruent to the male distribution. 
The difference in the mean log of wages for male and female executives is 0.2405 (= 6.452 -
6.2115). After estimating wage equations within each occupation the decomposition of the
earnings gap into intra-occupational effects and inter-occupational effects shows the following
results. If the occupational segregation is not taken into account (a clean Oaxaca decomposition)
77% of the gender earnings gap is due to differences in characteristics between men and women,
i.e. the explained part of the wage gap. If we take the distribution on occupations into account,
here the distribution into higher-level executives and lower-level executives, 68% of the wage gap
is due to differences in characteristics.
37% of the wage gap is difference in wages within the occupational groups, whereas the rest, 63%
of the wage gap, is the wage difference between the occupational groups. 64% of the wage gap,
16% of the intra-occupational and 48% of the inter-occupational effects can be explained by
differences in attributes.
 7 Here, the year-dummies and the intercept are pulled out as year-specific effects, not to disturb the real individual-,
firm- and job-specific effects.
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Table 7. Decomposition of the gender earnings differences 
Intra-occupational effects Inter-occupational effects Total
0.0897 0.1509 0.2406
37% 63% 100%
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
0.0379 0.0518 0.1147 0.0362 0.2406
 16%  22%  48%  15%  100%
Note: Table 7 shows the decomposition of the gender wage gap using occupational segregation according to
Equations (6) and (7).
This is similar to the results we would get, had we not pooled the CEO’s into the group of higher-
level executives (not shown here), where 70% of the wage differences would have been explained
by differences in attributes. 
Within the occupational groups, 58% (0.0518/0.0897) of the difference in compensation to men
and women is unexplained and therefore often called pure discrimination of the women. This is
a relatively large share of the wage difference within occupations, which can be explained further
by decomposing into individual-specific, firm-specific and job-specific characteristics as shown in
Table 8.
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Table 8. Decomposition of the gender earnings differences into different characteristics
Intra-occupational effects Inter-occupational effects
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Total
Year- specific -0.0033 0.6657 0.006 0.0115 0.6799
Individual-specific 0.0278 -0.5638 -0.0201 -0.0022 -0.5583
Firm-specific -0.0146 -0.0176 0.0043 0.0012 -0.0267
Job-specific 0.028 -0.0325 0.1245 0.0258 0.1457
Total 0.0379 0.0518 0.1147 0.0362 0.2406
Share of wage gap 16% 22% 48% 15% 100%
Note: This is a further decomposition of the last rows in Table 7.
A positive sign means that the component considered contributes positively to the gender wage
gap in favour of men. A negative sign means that the component considered contributes negatively
to the gender wage gap in favour of men, i.e. favours the women. It is remarkable that the total
effect from individual- specific characteristics is large and negative, indicating that individual23
characteristics work in favour of the women. The main part of this effect comes from the
unexplained part of the intra-occupational effect (-0.5638 in the second column in Table 8). Within
occupations (i.e. within the groups of higher-level and lower-level managers) women’s individual
characteristics get remunerated better than their male counterparts. This is cut down by the large
and positive effect coming from the year-specific dummies, but it is still a remarkable result. 
The main part of the explained wage differences between occupations obviously comes from the
job-specific characteristics. 83% of the inter-occupational effect (0.1245/0.1509) is due to
differences in job characteristics (first term in Equation 7). 
5.1. Decomposition using authority segregation
As stated earlier, inclusion of the level of real authority into the wage equations makes the wage
gap disappear. This leads to the impression that the level of authority is an important factor in
determining the wage gap. In that context, the wage gap is decomposed using authority level
instead of occupation in the decomposition. The decomposition can be made on the different levels
of authority, to get a larger knowledge on what this index says. Therefore, the ordered probit is
now estimated by gender, using the authority index to order the sample. The actual and simulated
distributions are shown in Table 9. The two highest groups of authority level are pooled to obtain
a reasonable amount of observations in each cell.








distribution, P ￿  f
Authority-level 1 55.1 32.1 41.2
Authority-level 2 28.0 30.3 31.4
Authority-level 3 13.2 21.8 18.1
Authority-level 4 3.7 15.8 9.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes as in Table 6.
The male executives are more evenly distributed in authority levels than the female executives. In
fact, half of the sample of women is categorized at the lowest possible level of authority, whereas
this is only true for one third of the men.
Ordinary wage equations on gender and authority-level are estimated and the wage gap is
decomposed into an intra-authority effect, i.e. wage differences within each level of authority, and
an inter-authority effect, i.e. wage differences between the levels. Results are shown in Table 10.24
Table 10. Decomposition of the gender earnings differences using authority levels
Intra-authority effects Inter-authority effects Total
0.0676 0.1733 0.2409
28% 72% 100%
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
0.0092 0.0584 0.0823 0.0909 0.2409
  4%  24%  34%  38%  100%
Note: Table 7 shows the decomposition of the gender wage gap using segregation on authority levels according to
Equations (6) and (7).
28% of the wage gap lies within each authority level. 86% of this is unexplained. 72% of the wage
gap is due to wage differences between the authority levels. All in all, 38% of the wage gap can
be explained by differences in characteristics and differences in distributions, but the remaining
62% cannot be explained by any reasonable factors.
Whether this is employers’ discrimination or lack of “animal spirit” among female executives
cannot be answered by the amount of data in hand. Further analyses and collection of data to
confirm/strengthen these results for Danish executives are desired and are on the future agenda.
Nevertheless, the distribution of power is in favour of the male executives and obtaining the same
occupational position cannot help the female executives in this game.
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines the gender earnings gap among employees at the executive level in a unique
data set of Danish executives in the period 1992-1995. Data include information on individual-,
firm- and job-specific characteristics and provide the possibility of taking account of more
explanatory variables in analysing the gender wage gap than usual. 
Ordinary wage equations on log annual total compensation show an unconditional wage gap of
23%, when just taking account of the gender dummy. Using a combination of characteristics,
being individual-specific, firm-specific and job-specific, the final wage equation shows no
significant differences in wages between male executives and female executives. I.e. the
combination of “Who you are”, “Where you work” and “What you do” tells us that executives get
remunerated equally regardless of gender.
The ordinary wage equations take the occupational distribution of the sexes as given. Thus,
occupational segregation is ruled out of the consideration on wage gaps. Occupational segregation
on the basis of gender is an important characteristic of the labour market and is therefore25
incorporated in the decomposition of the wage gap by Brown et al. (1980). The gender wage gap
is decomposed into an intra-occupational part and an inter-occupational part. These two parts both
contain wage differences due to differences in “characteristics” and wage differences due to
different remunerations of the “characteristics” (in quotes as characteristics in the latter part the
occupational distribution). 
The total gender wage gap in log mean wages is found to be 0.24. Wage differences within
occupations (the intra-occupational part) are causing 37% of the wage gap. Of these differences
within occupations, almost half of the difference is explained by differences in characteristics
between male and female executives, but 58% are unexplained differences due to differences in
remuneration of characteristics. Splitting these characteristics into individual-, firm- and job-
specific characteristics, we see that remuneration of individual-specific characteristics works in
favour of women. Within occupations women’s individual characteristics get remunerated better
than their male counterparts.
Wage differences between occupations are causing 63% of the wage gap. This is an obvious result
as the occupations in this sample contain the hierarchical levels of executives in firms. 76% of the
wage differences between occupations are explained by differences in the gender distribution on
occupations. Here, we consider the simulated female distribution, where the female characteristics
are remunerated as male characteristics. Decomposing further on characteristics, job-specific
characteristics obviously explain the main part of this.
Generally, the gender earnings gap is accounted for by a combination of  “Who you are”, “Where
you work” and “What you do”. Still, one third of the differences in wage between male and female
executives is “unexplained” in a decomposition of the wage gap containing differences in
characteristics and differences in occupations distribution as explanatory parts. One main counter-
effect in the wage gap is the remuneration of individual characteristics in favour of female
executives.
We know that within the occupational categories, wage differences are based on the level of
authority and we know that on average women have a lower level of authority. It is interesting to
see that only 38% of the gender wage earnings gap can be explained, when decomposing the wage
gap at authority levels. It seems that the assignment of authority level is more discriminating
against women than the occupational groups, higher-level executives and lower-level executives.
As mentioned above, the level of authority is not bound up with functional area or occupational
groups. The gender wage gap is clearly influenced by the real level of authority. Further work on
this issue is needed to investigate how this real authority is given and why it has much higher
influence on the wage gap than formal occupational positions in the firm.26
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